Being in Time
Dynamical models of phenomenal experience
Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood — indeed, can only be understood — as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis. This collection's broad scope and integrative approach, characterized by the view of the brain as a dynamical system that computes the mind's representation space, will be of interest to researchers, instructors, and students in the cognitive sciences wishing to acquaint themselves with the current thinking in consciousness research. Series B.
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 88] 2012. xvi, 261 pp.
Publishing status: Available
© John Benjamins Publishing Company
Table of Contents
Introduction | pp. vii–xvi
Time after time: Temporality in the dynamic brainDan Lloyd | pp. 1–20
Neuronal reflections and subjective awarenessRafael Malach | pp. 21–36
From probabilities to percepts: A subcortical “global best estimate buffer” as locus of phenomenal experienceBjorn Merker | pp. 37–80
Being in timeShimon Edelman and Tomer Fekete | pp. 81–94
The (lack of) mental life of some machinesTomer Fekete and Shimon Edelman | pp. 95–120
Restless minds, wandering brainsCees van Leeuwen and Dirk J.A. Smit | pp. 121–148
Fuzzy consciousnessStephanie Huette and Michael J. Spivey | pp. 149–164
Two dynamical themes in HusserlJeffrey Yoshimi | pp. 165–184
Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness: First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousnessWanja Wiese and Thomas Metzinger | pp. 185–210
The brain and its statesRichard Brown | pp. 211–230
An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousnessRick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen and Christopher T. Kello | pp. 231–258
Index | pp. 259–261
“The problem of consciousness is hard, so a book trying to solve it is brave. The chapters by the multiple authors of Being in Time make a bold attempt to account for consciousness in terms of the dynamics of brain processes unfolding in time. As such, the book is more about “feeling in time” than “being in time” (as even a teapot is being in time). [...] The dynamics of our doings already distinguish us from a teapot. Whether they are also sufficient to explain the fact that, unlike a teapot, we feel, the reader will have to judge. This dynamic book will well reward the reader’s time.
Stevan Harnad, Université du Québec à Montréal and University of Southampton, UK
“According to physics textbooks, time is expected to occupy an ever-shifting point with no width. But how does such an instantaneous present accommodate with our long lasting and content-rich conscious experience? This intriguing book, authored by distinguished scholars in the field, offers several insights about the problem of the dynamics of experience from different perspectives, ranging from cognitive science and philosophy to computer science and neurobiology.”
Antonio Chella, Università di Palermo
Cited by 5 other publications
Moyal, Roy, Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman
Ramstead, Maxwell J. D.
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Subjects & Metadata
BIC Subject: JMR – Cognition & cognitive psychology
BISAC Subject: PSY008000 – PSYCHOLOGY / Cognitive Psychology & Cognition