On the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness

Further considerations in the light of James’s conception

Thomas Natsoulas | University of California, Davis

How are the states of consciousness intrinsically so that they all qualify as “feelings” in William James’s generic sense? Only a small, propaedeutic part of what is required to address the intrinsic nature of such states can be accomplished here. I restrict my topic mainly to a certain characteristic that belongs to each of those pulses of mentality that successively make up James’s stream of consciousness. Certain statements of James’s are intended to pick out the variable “width” belonging to a stream of consciousness as it flows. Attention to this proposed property brings me to a discussion of (a) the unitary character of each of the states of consciousness however complex they may frequently be and (b) how to conceive of their complexity without recourse to a misleading spatial metaphor.

Keywords: feeling, self, ego, stream of consciousness, unconscious, intentionality, consciousness

Published online: 26 September 2000
https://doi.org/10.1075/ce.1.1.08nat

Cited by

Cited by 2 other publications

Natsoulas, Thomas

2003. The Stream of Consciousness: XXVIII. Does Consciousness Exist? (First Part). Imagination, Cognition and Personality 23:2 ► pp. 121 ff.

Natsoulas, Thomas

2005. The Stream of Consciousness: XXIX. Does Consciousness Exist? (Second Part). Imagination, Cognition and Personality 25:1 ► pp. 69 ff.

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