Langue and parole or only parole?

Inspired by an excellent article of J. Hewson (1976), this short paper points out some negative consequences of the fact that the Saussurean dichotomy of langue and parole has never received wider acceptance in American linguistics. The negligence of this important distinction has culminated in Chomsky’s astonishing proposition (1986) according to which the notion of ‘language’ is unimportant and dispensable. Such a view would in effect lead to the elimination of the proper object of linguistics. Language (langue) cannot be defined as the totality of utterances, in the same way, as human legs cannot be defined as the totality of the steps, which will be made by them. The understanding of important phenomena (e.g., language learning and linguistic change) is impossible without the notion of a social code (langue) and its individual use (parole). Necessarily, the denial of langue results in an increased proposition of ‘explanations’, that are empirically unverifiable. The notion ‘natural language’ cannot be derived from the speakers’ subjective knowledge of this language; every attempt to this effect must remain incurably circular.