Christopher Viger | Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario
I present the symbol grounding problem in the larger context of a materialist theory of content and then present two problems for causal, teleo-functional accounts of content. This leads to a distinction between two kinds of mental representations: presentations and symbols; only the latter are cognitive. Based on Milner and Goodale’s dual route model of vision, I posit the existence of precise interfaces between cognitive systems that are activated during object recognition. Interfaces are constructed as a child learns, and is taught, how to interact with its environment; hence, interface structure has a social determinant essential for symbol grounding. Symbols are encoded in the brain to exploit these interfaces, by having projections to the interfaces that are activated by what they symbolise. I conclude by situating my proposal in the context of Harnad’s (1990) solution to the symbol grounding problem and responding to three standard objections.
2016. Fodor on global cognition and scientific inference. Philosophical Psychology 29:2 ► pp. 157 ff.
Mendelovici, Angela
2013. Intentionalism about Moods. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2:2 ► pp. 126 ff.
van Geert, Paul
2009. Development, Complex Dynamic Systems of. In Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, ► pp. 1872 ff.
Cowley, Stephen J.
2008. Robots – the new linguistic informants?. Connection Science 20:4 ► pp. 359 ff.
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