What the legislature did not say
Legislative intentions and counterfactuals in legal argumentation
The paper is about the uses of the argument from legislative counterfactual intention, in the field of legal interpretation and argumentation. After presenting the argument from intention in general, it distinguishes the varities of the argument from counterfactual legislative intention and discusses their justification conditions.
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Esposito, Fabrizio & Giovanni Tuzet
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