Unaccusativity and theticity
This chapter examines theticity in intransitive sentences. Starting with the assumption that the
function of a thetic sentence is to introduce a referent into a discourse (without predicating anything of it), two
requirements are proposed to characterize thetic intransitives: (A) the sole argument of the sentence must be
vP-internal; and (B) the sole argument must be interpreted as a property. Both requirements have precedents in
previous work: (A) incorporates Guéron’s (1980) observations on what she
called the Presentation LF; and (B) builds on McNally’s (1998a) work on the
semantics and discourse function of existential sentences. These requirements show that theticity cannot be explained
by lexical verb or verb class; what matters for theticity is syntactic structure and semantic interpretation. It is
then shown that the thetic/categorical distinction cuts across a commonly-accepted distinction in intransitive
sentences, the unergative-unaccusative distinction. Specifically, only a subtype of unaccusative sentence, those with
the “existential unaccusative” structure (Irwin 2018a), satisfies (A) and
(B). By contrast, change-of-state unaccusatives pattern with unergative sentences in not being thetic.
Article outline
- 1.Introduction
- 1.1Background
- 1.2Proposal: Two requirements for intransitive thetic sentences
- 2.Two unaccusative structures
- 2.1Change-of-state unaccusatives
- 2.2Existential unaccusatives
- 2.3Summary
- 3.Intransitive sentences, presentation, and PP extraposition
- 3.1PP extraposition: Existential unaccusatives vs. unergatives
- 3.2PP extraposition: Change-of-state intransitives pattern like unergatives
- 3.3Summary: PP extraposition
- 4.Conclusion
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Acknowledgements
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Notes
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References