The ontological priority of representations
The case of mirror neurons and language
This paper reviews empirical data from monkey neurophysiology and human brain imaging regarding mirror neurons and language. These data are interpreted as suggesting that some of our cognitive intuitions about language and representations may be misleading. For centuries, representations have been conceptualized as secondary, both temporally and spatially, to a primary entity. What if representations have ontological priority? Can we even conceive this idea?
Cited by (1)
Cited by one other publication
Wallace, Cynthia R.
2019.
Attention, Representation, and Unsettlement in Katherena Vermette’s The Break, or, Teaching and (Re)Learning the Ethics of Reading.
Humanities 8:4
► pp. 164 ff.
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