Vol. 26:2/3 (2019) ► pp.321–356
On perception as the basis for object concepts
A critical analysis
Within cognitive and developmental psychology, it is commonly argued that perception is the basis for object concepts. According to this view, sensory experiences would translate into concepts thanks to the recognition, correlation and integration of physical attributes. Once attributes are integrated into general patterns, subjects would become able to parse objects into categories. In this article, we critically review the three epistemological perspectives according to which it can be claimed that object concepts depend on perception: state non-conceptualism, content non-conceptualism, and content conceptualism. We show that the three perspectives have problems that make perception inadequate as a conceptual basis. We suggest that the inquiry about the origin and development of object concepts can benefit from a pragmatic perspective that considers objects’ cultural functions as a conceptual foundation. We address this possibility from the theoretical framework of the pragmatics of the object, considering the importance of objects’ functional permanence.
Article outline
- 1.Introduction
- 2.Object concepts as a by-product of perception
- 3.The relationship between perceptions and concepts: Three options, three problem sets
- 3.1State non-conceptualism and its problems
- 3.1.1Perceptual constancy is not a natural phenomenon
- 3.1.2Perceptual constancy is conceptual
- 3.1.3The perception of qualities involves different developmental achievements
- 3.2Content non-conceptualism and its problems
- 3.2.1Non-conceptual perceptions cannot justify beliefs: A semantic problem
- 3.2.2Concepts do not have contact with the real world: A problem of reference
- 3.3Conceptualism and its problems
- 3.3.1Demonstrative concepts are a chimaera
- 3.3.2Explanatory circularity
- 3.3.3Misperception, culture and re-identification
- 3.3.4Content overlapping and animal cognition
- 3.3.5Inflexible concepts
- 3.3.6Individual concepts and explanatory solipsism
- 3.1State non-conceptualism and its problems
- 4.Perception in its labyrinth: A pragmatic and functional way out
- 4.1Perception is not contemplation
- 4.2The pragmatics of the object: Cognitive development from a pragmatic, functional, and cultural perspective
- 5.Conclusions
- Declaration of interest statement
- Notes
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References
https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.19027.ale