The coupling-constitution fallacy claims that arguments for extended cognition involve the inference of “x and y constitute z” from “x is coupled to y” and that such inferences are fallacious. We argue that the coupling-constitution fallacy fails in its goal to undermine the hypothesis of extended cognition: appeal to the coupling-constitution fallacy to rule out possible empirical counterexamples to intracranialism is fallacious. We demonstrate that appeals to coupling-constitution worries are problematic by constructing the fallacious argument against the hypothesis of extended cognition. We consider several objections to our argument and find them insufficient to rebut our conclusion.
2015. Content in languaging: why radical enactivism is incompatible with representational theories of language. Language Sciences 48 ► pp. 90 ff.
Krueger, Joel
2014. Varieties of extended emotions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13:4 ► pp. 533 ff.
Krueger, Joel & Thomas Szanto
2016. Extended emotions. Philosophy Compass 11:12 ► pp. 863 ff.
Lassiter, Charles
2016. Aristotle and distributed language: capacity, matter, structure, and languaging. Language Sciences 53 ► pp. 8 ff.
Lassiter, Charles & Joseph Vukov
2021. In search of an ontology for 4E theories: from new mechanism to causal powers realism. Synthese 199:3-4 ► pp. 9785 ff.
Lassiter, Charles & Joseph Vukov
2022. New Ontological Foundations for Extended Minds: Causal Powers Realism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
León, Felipe, Thomas Szanto & Dan Zahavi
2019. Emotional sharing and the extended mind. Synthese 196:12 ► pp. 4847 ff.
Piredda, Giulia
2017. The Mark of the Cognitive and the Coupling-Constitution Fallacy: A Defense of the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Frontiers in Psychology 8
This list is based on CrossRef data as of 13 june 2024. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers.
Any errors therein should be reported to them.