Vol. 21:1 (2013) ► pp.178–192
The coupling-constitution fallacy
Much ado about nothing
The coupling-constitution fallacy claims that arguments for extended cognition involve the inference of “x and y constitute z” from “x is coupled to y” and that such inferences are fallacious. We argue that the coupling-constitution fallacy fails in its goal to undermine the hypothesis of extended cognition: appeal to the coupling-constitution fallacy to rule out possible empirical counterexamples to intracranialism is fallacious. We demonstrate that appeals to coupling-constitution worries are problematic by constructing the fallacious argument against the hypothesis of extended cognition. We consider several objections to our argument and ﬁnd them insufficient to rebut our conclusion.
Cited by 8 other publications
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