Discussion published in:On Language and Consciousness
Ray Jackendoff and Wallace Chafe
[Pragmatics & Cognition 4:1] 1996
► pp. 139–152
Language and the mind
On concepts and value
The distinction between I- and E-concepts, derived from Chomsky's (1986) distinction between I- and E-language, has become an integral part of Jackendoff's conceptual semantics. Where, if at all, are they to be found in the model of the mind proposed in Jackendoff's core paper, i.e., in which of the three rings? How do they relate to the idea of I- and E-values, independently proposed by myself (but similarly inspired) in the framework of a theory of lexical semantics known as conceptual axiology? Where in the mind, if at all, are the latter to be found? I will argue that something is missing both in Jackendoff's conceptual semantics and in his picture of the mind: he fails to distinguish between meanings, values and concepts, and talks instead about "conceptual structure "—which presumably belongs to the conscious mind, and to it alone. In an attempt to bring values and concepts together in a comprehensive picture, I will point to the similarities between sensory and linguistic input, and provide details relating to the act of communication as I have come to see it throughout the years.
Published online: 01 January 1996
Cited by 2 other publications
Ascoli, Giorgio A.
1997. Dirk Geeraerts, Stefan Grondelaers, et Peter Bakema. The Structure of Lexical Variation: Meaning, Naming, and Context. Dans la collection Cognitive Linguistics Research 5. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 1994. Pp. 221. DM 128,-(relié).. Canadian Journal of Linguistics/Revue canadienne de linguistique 42:3 ► pp. 358 ff.
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