Toward a pragmatic account and taxonomy of valuative speech acts
This paper presents an account of value ascription as an illocutionary force, based on four claims: (1) that value
ascription is a kind of illocutionary force, defining a specific kind of speech act, i.e. valuative speech acts (VSAs); (2) that
the point of VSAs is ascribing an axiological value to a referent; (3) that VSAs create a weak, inside-oriented truth commitment;
and (4) that they are therefore more about the valuating subject than they are about the valuated object. This illocutionary force
is described using criteria taken from contemporary speech act theory as well as others that have proven informative. This
description results in a rich taxonomy of VSAs. This shows the viability and fruitfulness of a pragmatic account of value
ascription, and it contributes to the development of speech act theory, specifically with regard to the distinction between
primary and secondary illocutionary points, and the speech act taxonomy itself.
Article outline
- 1.Introduction
- 2.What is valuating?
- 2.1Value ascription is a kind of illocutionary force
- 2.2The point of VSAs
- 2.3The truth commitment of VSAs
- 2.4So what are VSAs about?
- 3.The valuative illocutionary force
- 3.1Felicity conditions
- 3.2Degree of strength of the IP
- 3.3Mode of achievement
- 3.3.1Speaker status
- 3.3.2How the referent is considered
- 3.3.3Value scales
- 3.3.4Situational boundedness
- 3.4Content conditions
- 3.5Causal force
- 3.6Impeachability
- 3.7Summary: A typology of VSAs
- 4.Conclusions: VSAs in speech act theory
- Notes
-
References