Chapter published in:
Essays on Linguistic Realism
Edited by Christina Behme and Martin Neef
[Studies in Language Companion Series 196] 2018
► pp. 235254
References

References

Bach, Kent
1994Conversational impliciture. Mind & Language 9: 124–162. CrossrefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, David
1996The Conscious Mind. Oxford: OUP.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald
1967Truth and meaning. Synthese 17: 304–323; reprinted in Davidson (2001). CrossrefGoogle Scholar
2001Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. CrossrefGoogle Scholar
Fine, Kit
2007Semantic Relationism. Malden MA: Blackwell. CrossrefGoogle Scholar
Grice, Paul
1967Logic and conversation (given in 1967 as the William James lectures at Harvard University). In Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3: Speech Acts, Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan (eds), 41–58. New York NY: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Kripke, Saul
1979A puzzle about belief. In Meaning and Use, Avishai Margalit (ed.), 239–283. Dordrecht: Reidel. CrossrefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary
1970Is semantics possible? Metaphilosophy 1(3): 187–201; reprinted in Putnam (1975a). CrossrefGoogle Scholar
1975aPhilosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Cambridge: CUP.Google Scholar
1975bThe meaning of ‘meaning’. In Language, Mind, and Knowledge [Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7], Keith Gunderson (ed.), 131–193. Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Putnam (1975a).Google Scholar
Salmon, Nathan
2012Recurrence. Philosophical Studies 159: 407–441. CrossrefGoogle Scholar
Soames, Scott
1987Direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content. Philosophical Topics 15: 44–87. Reprinted in Soames (2009c). CrossrefGoogle Scholar
2002Beyond Rigidity. Oxford: OUP. CrossrefGoogle Scholar
2005Reference and Description. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
2006Understanding assertion. In Content and Modality, Judith Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds), 222–250. Oxford: OUP. Reprinted in Soames 2009c.Google Scholar
2008aDrawing the line between meaning and implicature – and relating both to assertion. Nous 42: 529–554. Reprinted in Soames (2009b). CrossrefGoogle Scholar
2008bWhy propositions can’t be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37: 267–276. Reprinted in Soames (2009c). CrossrefGoogle Scholar
2009aThe gap between meaning and assertion: Why what we literally say often differs from what our words literally mean. In Soames (2009b), 278–297.Google Scholar
2009bPhilosophical Essays, Vol. 1. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
2009cPhilosophical Essays, Vol. 2. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
2010aWhat is Meaning? Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
2010bPhilosophy of Language. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
2012Two versions of Millianism. In Reference and Referring, Topics in Philosophy, Vol. 10, Joseph Campbell, Michael O’Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds), 83–118. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Reprinted in Soames (2014).Google Scholar
2014Analytic Philosophy in America. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
2015Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. CrossrefGoogle Scholar
Stalnaker, Robert
1978Assertion. In Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9: Pragmatics, Peter Cole (ed.), 315–322. New York NY: Academic Press.Google Scholar