Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

An Anthology

Editor
| Indiana State University
HardboundAvailable
ISBN 9789027251916 (Eur) | EUR 115.00
ISBN 9781588114952 (USA) | USD 173.00
 
PaperbackAvailable
ISBN 9789027251923 (Eur) | EUR 72.00
ISBN 9781588114969 (USA) | USD 108.00
 
e-Book
ISBN 9789027295699 | EUR 115.00/72.00*
| USD 173.00/108.00*
 
Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness have in common the idea that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation. This volume presents fourteen previously unpublished essays both defending and criticizing this approach to the problem of consciousness. It is the first anthology devoted entirely to HO theories of consciousness. There are several kinds of HO theory, such as the HOT (higher-order thought) and HOP (higher-order perception) models, and each is discussed and debated. Part One contains essays by authors who defend some form of HO theory. Part Two includes papers by those who are critics of the HO approach. Some of the topics covered include animal consciousness, misrepresentation, the nature of pain, subvocal speech, subliminal perception, blindsight, the nature of emotion, the difference between perception and thought, first-order versus higher-order theories of consciousness, and the relationship between nonconscious and conscious mentality. (Series A)
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 56]  2004.  xii, 371 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Table of Contents
Contributors
ix
1. Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview
Rocco J. Gennaro
1–13
Part I: Defenders of higher-order theories
2. Varieties of higher-order theory
David M. Rosenthal
17–44
3. Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and Levine
Rocco J. Gennaro
45–66
4. Higher-order global states (HOGS): An alternative higher-order model of consciousness
Robert Van Gulick
67–92
5. The superiority of HOP to HOT
William G. Lycan
93–113
6. HOP over FOR, HOT theory
Peter Carruthers
115–135
7. A higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousness
Edmund T. Rolls
137–172
8. Assumptions of a subjective measure of consciousness: Three mappings
Zoltán Dienes and Josef Perner
173–199
Part II: Critics of the higher-order approach
9. What phenomenal consciousness is like
Alex Byrne
203–225
10. Either FOR or HOR: A false dichotomy
Robert W. Lurz
227–254
11. A cold look at HOT theory
William Seager
255–275
12. HOT theories of consciousness: More sad tales of philosophical intuitions gone astray
Valerie Gray Hardcastle
277–294
13. A few thoughts too many?
William S. Robinson
295–313
14. Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheory
Donelson E. Dulany
315–338
15. Ouch! An essay on pain
Christopher S. Hill
339–362
Index of names
363
Index of topics
365
Cited by

Cited by other publications

Brown, Richard
2015. The HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Studies 172:7  pp. 1783 ff. Crossref logo
Chaturvedi, Madhu Mangal & Ravishankar Sarma, A. V.
2019. Does Inner Awareness Always Accompany Outer Awareness During Perception?. Problemos 96  pp. 134 ff. Crossref logo
Coleman, Sam
2015. Quotational higher-order thought theory. Philosophical Studies 172:10  pp. 2705 ff. Crossref logo
de Sá Pereira, Roberto Horácio
2020. Knowing qualia: reloading the displaced perception model. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 7:1 Crossref logo
Farrell, Jonathan
2018. Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness. Philosophical Studies 175:11  pp. 2743 ff. Crossref logo
Ghijsen, Harmen
2016.  In The Puzzle of Perceptual Justification,  pp. 125 ff. Crossref logo
Giananti, Andrea
2020. I know how I know: perception, self-awareness, self-knowledge. Synthese Crossref logo
Gois, Isabel
2010. A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Philosophia 38:1  pp. 143 ff. Crossref logo
Howell, Robert J.
2010. Subjectivity and the Elusiveness of the Self. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40:3  pp. 459 ff. Crossref logo
Jagnow, René
2012. Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90:1  pp. 57 ff. Crossref logo
O’Regan, J. Kevin
2012. How to Build a Robot that is Conscious and Feels. Minds and Machines 22:2  pp. 117 ff. Crossref logo
Peters, Frederic
2014. Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues. Axiomathes 24:4  pp. 441 ff. Crossref logo
Rolls, Edmund T.
2013. What are Emotional States, and Why Do We Have Them?. Emotion Review 5:3  pp. 241 ff. Crossref logo
Rolls, Edmund T.
2020. Neural Computations Underlying Phenomenal Consciousness: A Higher Order Syntactic Thought Theory. Frontiers in Psychology 11 Crossref logo
Schlicht, Tobias
2012. Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11:3  pp. 309 ff. Crossref logo
Stoljar, Daniel
2016. The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness. Mind 125:500  pp. 1161 ff. Crossref logo
Sturm, Thomas & Falk Wunderlich
2010. Kant and the scientific study of consciousness. History of the Human Sciences 23:3  pp. 48 ff. Crossref logo

This list is based on CrossRef data as of 05 september 2020. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers. Any errors therein should be reported to them.

Subjects

Consciousness Research

Consciousness research

Philosophy

Philosophy
BIC Subject: JMT – States of consciousness
BISAC Subject: PSY020000 – PSYCHOLOGY / Neuropsychology
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number:  2004041066