Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
An Anthology
Editor
Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness have in common the idea that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation. This volume presents fourteen previously unpublished essays both defending and criticizing this approach to the problem of consciousness. It is the first anthology devoted entirely to HO theories of consciousness. There are several kinds of HO theory, such as the HOT (higher-order thought) and HOP (higher-order perception) models, and each is discussed and debated. Part One contains essays by authors who defend some form of HO theory. Part Two includes papers by those who are critics of the HO approach. Some of the topics covered include animal consciousness, misrepresentation, the nature of pain, subvocal speech, subliminal perception, blindsight, the nature of emotion, the difference between perception and thought, first-order versus higher-order theories of consciousness, and the relationship between nonconscious and conscious mentality. (Series A)
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 56] 2004. xii, 371 pp.
Publishing status: Available
© John Benjamins Publishing Company
Table of Contents
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Contributors | p. ix
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1. Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overviewRocco J. Gennaro | pp. 1–13
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Part I: Defenders of higher-order theories
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2. Varieties of higher-order theoryDavid M. Rosenthal | pp. 17–44
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3. Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and LevineRocco J. Gennaro | pp. 45–66
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4. Higher-order global states (HOGS): An alternative higher-order model of consciousnessRobert Van Gulick | pp. 67–92
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5. The superiority of HOP to HOTWilliam G. Lycan | pp. 93–113
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6. HOP over FOR, HOT theoryPeter Carruthers | pp. 115–135
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7. A higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousnessEdmund T. Rolls | pp. 137–172
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8. Assumptions of a subjective measure of consciousness: Three mappingsZoltán Dienes and Josef Perner | pp. 173–199
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Part II: Critics of the higher-order approach
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9. What phenomenal consciousness is likeAlex Byrne | pp. 203–225
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10. Either FOR or HOR: A false dichotomyRobert W. Lurz | pp. 227–254
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11. A cold look at HOT theoryWilliam Seager | pp. 255–275
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12. HOT theories of consciousness: More sad tales of philosophical intuitions gone astrayValerie Gray Hardcastle | pp. 277–294
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13. A few thoughts too many?William S. Robinson | pp. 295–313
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14. Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheoryDonelson E. Dulany | pp. 315–338
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15. Ouch! An essay on painChristopher S. Hill | pp. 339–362
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Index of names | p. 363
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Index of topics | p. 365
Cited by
Cited by 23 other publications
Brown, Richard
2015. The HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Studies 172:7 ► pp. 1783 ff. 
Carruthers, Peter
2017. Higher‐Order Theories of Consciousness. In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, ► pp. 288 ff.
Chaturvedi, Madhu Mangal & A. V. Ravishankar Sarma
2019. Does Inner Awareness Always Accompany Outer Awareness During Perception?. Problemos 96 ► pp. 134 ff.
Coleman, Sam
2015. Quotational higher-order thought theory. Philosophical Studies 172:10 ► pp. 2705 ff.
de Sá Pereira, Roberto Horácio
2020. Knowing qualia: reloading the displaced perception model. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 7:1
Farrell, Jonathan
2018. Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness. Philosophical Studies 175:11 ► pp. 2743 ff.
Ghijsen, Harmen
2016. A Higher-Order Rejoinder for Reliabilism. In The Puzzle of Perceptual Justification [Synthese Library, 377], ► pp. 125 ff.
Giananti, Andrea
2021. I know how I know: perception, self-awareness, self-knowledge. Synthese 198:11 ► pp. 10355 ff.
Gois, Isabel
2010. A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Philosophia 38:1 ► pp. 143 ff.
Halper, Phil, Kenneth Williford, David Rudrauf & Perry N. Fuchs
2021. Against Neo-Cartesianism: Neurofunctional Resilience and Animal Pain. Philosophical Psychology 34:4 ► pp. 474 ff.
Howell, Robert J.
2010. Subjectivity and the Elusiveness of the Self. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40:3 ► pp. 459 ff.
Hüsch, Sebastian & Klaus Viertbauer
2022. Anti-Climacus and the Demoralization of Sin. The Monist 105:3 ► pp. 369 ff.
Jagnow, René
2012. Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90:1 ► pp. 57 ff.
Lycan, William G.
2012. Consciousness. In The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science,
O’Regan, J. Kevin
2012. How to Build a Robot that is Conscious and Feels. Minds and Machines 22:2 ► pp. 117 ff.
Perrin, Denis & André Sant’Anna
2022. Episodic memory and the feeling of pastness: from intentionalism to metacognition. Synthese 200:2
Peters, Frederic
2014. Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues. Axiomathes 24:4 ► pp. 441 ff.
Rolls, Edmund T.
2013. What are Emotional States, and Why Do We Have Them?. Emotion Review 5:3 ► pp. 241 ff.
2020. Neural Computations Underlying Phenomenal Consciousness: A Higher Order Syntactic Thought Theory. Frontiers in Psychology 11
Rolls, Edmund T., Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson
2007. The Affective Neuroscience of Consciousness: Higher Order Syntactic Thoughts, Dual Routes to Emotion and Action, and Consciousness. In The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, ► pp. 831 ff.
Schlicht, Tobias
2012. Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11:3 ► pp. 309 ff.
Stoljar, Daniel
2016. The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness. Mind 125:500 ► pp. 1161 ff.
Sturm, Thomas & Falk Wunderlich
2010. Kant and the scientific study of consciousness. History of the Human Sciences 23:3 ► pp. 48 ff.
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Subjects
Main BIC Subject
JMT: States of consciousness
Main BISAC Subject
PSY020000: PSYCHOLOGY / Neuropsychology