Consciousness and Object
A mind-object identity physicalist theory
This groundbreaking hypothesis is supported by recent empirical findings in both perception and neuroscience, and is herein tested against a series of objections of both conceptual and empirical nature: the traditional mind-brain identity arguments from illusion, hallucinations, dreams, and mental imagery. The theory is then compared with existing externalist approaches including disjunctivism, realism, embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind. Can experience and objects be one and the same?
Table of Contents
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Foreword | pp. ix–xiii
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Acknowledgements | pp. xv–15
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Chapter 1. A materialist theory of the mind | pp. 1–6
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Chapter 2. Naïve materialism | pp. 7–29
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Chapter 3. Consciousness and nature | pp. 31–44
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Chapter 4. A mind-object identity theory | pp. 45–65
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Chapter 5. The actual object | pp. 67–94
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Chapter 6. Consciousness, body, and world | pp. 95–119
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Chapter 7. All experience is identity | pp. 121–148
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Chapter 8. Neuroscientific evidence | pp. 149–172
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Chapter 9. Subjectivity reloaded | pp. 173–196
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Chapter 10. A reduction | pp. 197–210
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Chapter 11. A comparison with other views | pp. 211–221
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Chapter 12. The last blow to the narcissism of man | pp. 223–230
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In a nutshell | p. 231
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References | pp. 233–249
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Index | pp. 251–254
Cited by (8)
Cited by eight other publications
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